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Justyna Gotkowska, Piotr Szymański
Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy and its enhanced military activity in the Nordic-Baltic 
region has led to revaluations in Sweden’s and Finland’s security and defence policies and 
a rethinking of the formats of their military co-operation. While remaining outside NATO, the 
two states have been developing closer bilateral defence co-operation and working more 
closely with the United States, while at the same time developing co-operation with NATO. 
Sweden and Finland perceive the United States as the guarantor of regional and European 
security. From their point of view, the United States is currently the country that has both the 
necessary military capabilities and the political will to react in the event of a conflict between 
Russia and NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region, in which both countries would inevitably become 
involved despite their non-aligned status. For Sweden and Finland, intensified co-operation 
with the United States offers an alternative to NATO membership, which is currently out of 
the question for domestic political reasons. Meanwhile, the US has also become increasingly 
aware of the strategic importance of the two states, which, for the purposes of contingency 
planning, are in fact an extension of NATO’s north-eastern flank. 
Alliance with the United States  
as an alternative to NATO membership? 
Because of their geographic location, Sweden 
and Finland are both very important for the 
planning and potential execution of military 
operations by NATO (primarily the US) and by 
Russia in the Nordic-Baltic region. In the case of 
Sweden, this especially concerns the Baltic Sea 
region, and in the case of Finland, mainly the 
High North. The governments of both countries 
are aware that, despite their formal non-aligned 
status Russia would not respect their neutrality 
in the event of a crisis or conflict in Northern Eu-
rope. Moscow views Sweden and Finland as in-
tegral parts of the West which would collabora-
te with NATO in case of confrontation between 
Russia and the Alliance. Both countries are EU 
members and are bound by the EU’s mutual 
assistance clause (Article 42(7) TEU), and both 
have been co-operating with NATO for years. 
In view of Russia’s aggressive policy (the in-
terventions in Ukraine and Syria and the 
increased military activity in the Nordic-Baltic 
region, including aggressive military drill scena-
rios involving simulated attacks against Sweden 
and Finland), the governments in Stockholm 
and Helsinki have been reviewing their securi-
ty and defence policies and formats of milita-
ry co-operation. After focusing on the Nordic 
Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) for some 
time, currently their priority is to develop closer 
Swedish-Finnish defence co-operation1. While 
the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO 
1 This is also related to the change in the priorities of other 
Nordic partners, like Denmark and Norway, which have 
been focusing mainly on closer co-operation with allies 
within NATO since 2014.
Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop  
closer military co-operation with the United States
2OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 205
would in the long term significantly improve 
regional security by delineating a clear border 
between Russia and the Alliance in the Nordic
-Baltic region (while admittedly triggering a ne-
gative reaction from the Kremlin in the short 
term), one should not expect either country 
to take any steps towards NATO membership 
in the next few years. There is not enough po-
litical and public support for such a move in 
either country. Sweden’s 2014-2018 coalition 
agreement between the Social Democrats and 
the Greens stipulates that Sweden will not seek 
NATO membership. Generally, though, the idea 
of joining NATO has recently gained more sup-
port within the elites and the general public. If 
Russia continues to undertake provocative ac-
tions in the region, a new political and public 
consensus for accession may emerge after the 
next Swedish parliamentary elections in 2018. 
Finland, on the other hand, has for years been 
sceptical about NATO membership (the Mini-
stry of Foreign Affairs is currently working on 
a new report on the consequences of potential 
accession; the last assessment was published 
in 2007). It fears the aggressive pre-emptive 
measures that Russia might take to hinder its 
accession to the Alliance, has concerns about 
becoming a NATO front-line state (it shares 
around 1300 km of its border with Russia) and 
does not want to assume an obligation to ac-
tively defend the Baltic states. Moreover, the 
Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine 
have hardly contributed to a rise in support for 
NATO membership in Finland. 
However, while they have not decided to join 
NATO, both Sweden and Finland have been de-
veloping closer co-operation with the Alliance, 
including common military exercises, training 
activities, participation in the NATO Response 
Force, and the ratification and implementation 
of the Host Nation Support agreement which 
opens political and military-technological 
opportunities for NATO to use the land terri-
tory, airspace and territorial waters of Sweden 
and Finland. Nevertheless, the two countries 
are aware of the growing disparities in how the 
different NATO member states perceive the Al-
liance’s challenges and the threats it is facing, 
its lengthy decision-making processes and the 
time it takes to implement decisions, as well 
as the shrinking defence budgets and military 
capabilities of the European allies. Therefore, 
despite the changed priorities of US security 
policy, Sweden and Finland both see the Uni-
ted States as the driving force and the ally who 
can contribute most to strengthening NATO’s 
presence on its eastern flank, as well as the real 
guarantor of regional and European security. 
As NATO membership is not an option for do-
mestic political reasons, the United States has 
become Stockholm and Helsinki’s priority part-
ner for defence co-operation. 
From the American point of view, Sweden 
and Finland are an extension of NATO’s north- 
-eastern flank. Stepping up the US military pre-
sence in those states is intended as a signal to 
Russia that any attempts at using the territories 
of Sweden and Finland for aggressive actions in 
the Nordic-Baltic region will be met by a reaction 
from the US. Since 2015, the United States has 
been developing more intensive co-operation 
with the two states, mainly involving the air 
forces and navies. In doing this, the US seeks 
to make the most of the existing formats of 
multinational military drills in the Nordic- 
-Baltic region, including exercises under US 
command (BALTOPS, Saber Strike), NATO exer-
cises (BRTE) and Nordic exercises (Arctic Chal-
lenge, Cold Response). However, bilateral and 
trilateral formats have also been developed 
(FSTE, Arrow16), with the US units participating 
in exercises in the Baltic states. While the scale 
of the United States’ co-operation with Sweden 
The United States is becoming Sweden’s 
and Finland’s priority partner for defence 
co-operation.
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and Finland is much smaller than the scale of its 
collaboration with NATO member states from 
the Nordic-Baltic region (Norway, the Baltic 
states, Poland), developing closer bilateral and 
trilateral military co-operation with the United 
States is nonetheless a breakthrough for Swe-
den, Finland and the region as a whole.
Sweden: increasingly aware 
of the geopolitical realities
Even during the Cold War, neutral Sweden pur-
sued a policy of secret military co-operation 
with NATO and the US. The leaders in Stockholm 
realised that their chances of not being affected 
by potential military operations in Northern Eu-
rope were slim, and that in the event of a war, 
quick military assistance from the West would 
be the country’s only chance of avoiding a So-
viet occupation. Publicly, however, Sweden’s 
Social Democratic governments often criticised 
the United States’ foreign and security policy. 
For this reason, anti-American resentment 
prevailed in Sweden long after the end of the 
Cold War, and grew stronger after the fiercely 
criticised US intervention in Iraq in 2003. It was 
only under the government of the centre-right 
(Alliansen) coalition led by PM Fredrik Reinfeldt 
(2006–2014) that Sweden decided to co-opera-
te more closely with NATO and the US (exercises 
and training, participation in the operations in 
Afghanistan and Libya). 
Given Russia’s aggressive and revisionist poli-
cy (the wars in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 
2014), Stockholm has become increasingly awa-
re that the Nordic-Baltic region might become 
an arena of confrontation between the Russia 
and the West. Bearing in mind that the country’s 
own military potential has shrunk over the last 
twenty years, and that there is insufficient public 
and political support for membership in NATO, 
nearly all political parties in Sweden support 
closer co-operation with the United States (with 
marginal protests from the peace movements). 
In 2015 the minority government of the Social 
Democrats and the Greens led by PM Stefan 
Löfven adopted Sweden’s new security strategy 
for the years 2016–2020 (in agreement with the 
conservative opposition), a plan which has been 
approved by the parliament. According to this 
document, Stockholm views trans-Atlantic co
-operation as key to ensuring European security. 
The strategy further points out that the United 
States is the only Western state with sufficient 
military capabilities to conduct operations aga-
inst an enemy possessing a large conventional 
armed forces2. Co-operation with the United 
States in areas such as interoperability, exercises 
and training, military equipment and operations 
abroad is set to be a priority for the Swedish Ar-
med Forces in the years 2016–20203. Thus, the 
role of bilateral co-operation with the United 
States in Sweden’s security policy is set to grow, 
unless Sweden’s political elites reach agreement 
over accession to NATO after 2018. 
The US-Swedish military co-operation has been 
gaining momentum since 2015. At that time the 
Swedish Air Force held the first exercise of its 
kind with the US F-16 fighters over the Baltic Sea 
(as part of the Finland-Sweden Training Event, 
FSTE), and the US Air Force made a major con-
tribution to the Swedish-Norwegian-Finnish drill 
2 The Government of Sweden, Regeringens proposition 
2014/15:109, Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges för-
svar 2016–2020, 23 April 2015, p. 26-28, http://www.
regeringen.se/contentassets/266e64ec3a254a6087e-
be9e413806819/proposition-201415109-forsvarspoli-
tisk-inriktning--sveriges-forsvar-2016-2020 
3 The Swedish Armed Forces, Försvarsmaktens Års-
redovisning 2015, 16 February 2016, p. 34, http://
www.forsvarsmakten.se/siteassets/4-om-myndig-
heten/dokumentfiler/arsredovisningar/arsredovis-
ning-2015/160122-003-forsvarsmaktens-arsredovis-
ning-2015-huvuddokument.pdf 
Co-operation with the US, in areas such 
as interoperability, exercises and train-
ing, military equipment and operations 
abroad, is set to be a priority for the Swed-
ish Armed Forces in the years 2016–2020.
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in the far north (the Arctic Challenge Exercise, 
ACE). In a symbolic move, the multinational BAL-
TOPS 2015 exercise, organised annually by the 
United States Naval Forces Europe (NAVFOREUR), 
included the first amphibious assault of its kind 
(executed by US and British marines, among 
others) on the south-western shore of Sweden. 
As part of the Cold Response exercise (February
-March 2016) in Norway, a US infantry batta-
lion operated under Swedish command within 
an international brigade. As of 2016, the Swe-
dish Armed Forces are to pursue regular mili-
tary staff-to-staff consultations with the US 
European Command (USEUCOM). According to 
statements by General Ben Hodges, the com-
mander of the US Army Europe (USAREUR), the 
US also intends to start military drills involving 
the deployment of US military equipment from 
bases in Europe to Sweden by sea, including the 
Patriot air defence systems4.
Finland: overcoming the Cold War taboo
After the end of the Cold War Finland rejected 
the political and military limitations imposed on 
it after World War II, ended its dependence on 
Moscow and adopted a course towards inte-
gration with the West (joining the EU, but not 
NATO). Rapprochement with the United States 
was part of this reorientation of Finnish foreign 
and security policy. The 1992 political decision 
to purchase 62 US-made F-18 Hornet fighters 
4 Exklusiv intervju: USA vill flytta krigsmateriel till Sverige, 
TV4 Nyheterna, 7 March 2016, http://www.tv4.se/nyhe-
terna/klipp/exklusiv-intervju-usa-vill-flytta-krigsmate-
riel-till-sverige-3294412 
was crucial in this context, as it led to ongoing 
Finnish-American military co-operation on pilot 
training, exercises and aircraft modernisation 
(for example, the purchase of around 70 US-ma-
de long-range air-to-surface JASSM missiles in 
2012). Moreover, the Finnish Armed Forces have 
been increasing their interoperability with the 
US military, mainly in the framework of the mul-
tilateral regional exercises within the NATO Part-
nership for Peace programme. At the same time, 
though, this co-operation with the United States 
has not been emphasised to the domestic pu-
blic, because of the strong traditions of neutrali-
ty and a reluctance to vex relations with Russia. 
From the point of view of the centre-right go-
vernment under PM Juha Sipilä (a coalition for-
med in 2015 by the Centre Party, the Finns Par-
ty and the National Coalition Party), the United 
States plays a key role in ensuring the security 
of the Nordic-Baltic region and has not only the 
necessary military potential, but also the will to 
stop Russia’s potential aggressive actions. Ho-
wever, developing deeper bilateral military co
-operation with the US is politically controver-
sial and, unlike in Sweden, there is no political 
consensus over it. Sections of the political elite 
and the public still deeply hold a belief, dating 
back to the Cold War era, that it is best to stay 
out of tensions between Russia and the West, 
despite the fact that the accession of the Bal-
tic states to NATO has changed the geopolitical 
situation. The ruling coalition’s policy of de-
veloping closer military co-operation with the 
United States has the support of the opposition 
Swedish People’s Party and (partly) the Greens, 
while the opposition Social Democrats and the 
Left Alliance remain sceptical and fears to pro-
voke Russia and to abandon the non-alignment 
policy5. However, should tensions with Russia 
5 Eeva Palojärvi, Kiistelty Rissalan lento harjoitus sai alkun-
sa Yhdysvaltain aloitteesta, Helsingin Sanomat, 12 Febru-
ary 2016, http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/a1455256886428; 
Juha-Pekka Tikka, ‘Hävittäjien vierailu yhtä dramaattis-
ta kuin roska-auton käynti takapihalla’, Verkkouutiset, 
11 February 2016, http://www.verkkouutiset.fi/kotimaa/
laivue%20haglund-46613 
If tensions with Russia persist in the long 
term, the importance of the United States 
in Finland’s security and defence policy may 
further increase, possibly moving toward an 
informal alliance.
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persist in the long term, the importance of the 
United States in Finland’s security and defen-
ce policy may increase further, possibly moving 
towards an informal alliance, as Finland’s acces-
sion to NATO is hardly realistic for the reasons 
discussed above. 
The stepped-up US-Finnish military co-opera-
tion mainly involves more extensive joint exer-
cises in Finland, a trend that will be particularly 
visible in 2016. In May, as part of the US Atlantic 
Resolve operation aimed at strengthening NA-
TO’s eastern flank, Rissala airbase in central Fin-
land (some 200 km away from the border with 
Russia) will host a relatively large exercise of US 
and Finnish air forces (with 6–8 F-15C fighters 
of the US National Guard), with the possible 
participation of other Nordic partners. At the 
same time a US mechanised infantry company 
(with around 20 Stryker armoured vehicles) will 
take part in the Finnish land forces’ Arrow16 
exercise in western Finland (this will be the first 
Finnish-American exercise of this kind). An am-
phibious assault by US marines on the south
-western shores of Finland will be part of the 
BALTOPS 2016 multinational exercise in June 
20166. The two countries have also been deepe-
ning their co-operation on the modernisation 
of the Finnish Armed Forces (the acquisition of 
Stinger MANPAD systems and guided munition 
for multiple rocket launcher systems, the inte-
gration of JDAM and JSOW guided bombs and 
JASSM missiles with the F-18 Hornet fighters 
aircraft) and developing more intensive milita-
ry and political contacts. Moreover, Finland has 
declared its readiness to continue supporting 
the United States in overseas deployments, de-
spite the government plans to scale down the 
international involvement of the Finnish Armed 
Forces. The government has already pledged to 
increase the size of the Finnish training mission 
in Iraq as part of the US-led international co-
alition to 100 instructors (from the current 50)7.
6 Pekka Tiinanen, USA:n sotilaita Suomeen kolmeen harjoi-
tukseen, Iltalehti, 18 February 2016, http://www.iltalehti.
fi/uutiset/2016021821138187_uu.shtml; ‘Kohuttu harjoitus 
yhdysvaltalaisten kanssa täysin ensimmäinen - ”nyt tes-
tataan kyvykkyyttä”’, Iltalehti, 26 February 2016, http://
www.iltalehti.fi/uutiset/2016022621180984_uu.shtml 
7 The Ministry of Defence of Finland, Puolustusministeri Ni-
inistö: Irakin koulutusoperaatioon osallistuminen kehittää 
puolustusvoimien suorituskykyjä, 9 March 2016, http://
valtioneuvosto.fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/puolustusmi-
nisteri-niinisto-irakin-koulutusoperaatioon-osallistumi-
nen-kehittaa-puolustusvoimien-suorituskykyja 
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Major bilateral, trilateral and multilateral military exercises involving Sweden, Finland 
and the United States in the Nordic-Baltic region (2015–2016)
Exercises under US command
BALTOPS: In June 2015 Sweden and Finland participated in the BALTOPS multinational naval exer-
cise led by the United States Naval Forces Europe and Africa (NAVFOREUR) in the Baltic Sea region. 
Sweden deployed 300 troops, a Stockholm-class missile corvette and eight JAS 39 Gripen fighter air-
craft, while Finland contributed 180 troops and a minelayer. The USA deployed 670 troops, 3 vessels 
(a landing platform, a missile cruiser and a missile destroyer), naval helicopters and B-52 strategic 
bombers. The exercise scenario included a combined sea and land operation in the Baltic Sea region 
with air support. The US B-52 bombers simulated an operation of dropping naval mines on the Swe-
dish coast. Marines from the USA, Great Britain, Sweden and Finland, among others, exercised an 
amphibious assault on the Swedish shore. BALTOPS 2016 will include an amphibious assault of US 
marines on the south-western coast of Finland (the Hanko Peninsula). 
SABER STRIKE: As part of the land forces exercise Saber Strike 2015, taking place in Poland and the 
Baltic states and organised by the US Army in Europe (USAREUR), a Finnish company (around 100 tro-
ops with AMOS self-propelled mortars) held drills on Latvian territory, together with companies from 
the United States, Great Britain and Norway as well as a Baltic battalion. The exercise scenario inc-
luded defensive tasks performed by multinational forces (co-operation of armoured units, air support, 
airborne landing, retaking control of critical infrastructure, brigade and battalion-level command).
NATO exercises
BRTE: In 2015 the USA, Sweden and Finland took part in successive editions (a total of three in 2015) 
of the Baltic Region Training Event (BRTE) organised by NATO in the international airspace over the 
Baltic Sea and in the airspace of the Baltic states. Sweden and Finland usually deployed 2 fighters 
each, and the USA an aerial refuelling aircraft. The drill scenarios included landing in bases on the 
territories of the Baltic states, interceptions, search and rescue operations, close air support and 
air-to-air refuelling. 
Nordic exercises
Arctic Challenge: In late May and early June 2015, the Norwegian-led exercise Arctic Challenge 
2015 took place in the airspace of northern Norway, Sweden and Finland. It involved 115 aircraft and 
4000 troops from 9 states. The USA deployed 12 F-16 fighter aircraft (base in Kallax, Sweden), Swe-
den deployed 18 JAS 39 Gripen fighter aircraft (bases in Kallax and Rovaniemi, Finland), and Finland 
deployed 16 F-18 Hornet fighter aircraft (Rovaniemi). The exercise scenario included i.e. suppression 
of enemy air defences (destruction of ground targets, simulated in the case of Finland), low-altitude 
flights and air-to-air refuelling. 
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Cold Response: In February and March 2016, Norway hosted the Cold Response 2016 exercise 
involving 15,000 troops from 13 states including 3000 from the United States, 2000 from Sweden 
and 430 from Finland. It was a joint and combined forces exercise involving land air and sea com-
ponents. The USA used its military equipment prepositioned in Norway (tanks and artillery), a B-52 
bomber and an amphibious landing platform, among other items. Finland contributed a mechani-
sed infantry battalion (with AMOS self-propelled mortars and XA-360 armoured carriers, among 
other equipment), with one company each from Sweden and Norway operating under its command 
(as part of a multinational brigade under Swedish command). The scenario included a UN Security 
Council mandated operation to regain territory seized by the enemy in Arctic conditions. 
Bilateral and trilateral exercises involving Sweden, Finland and the United States
Finland-Sweden Training Event, FSTE: The FSTE is a series of exercises for the Swedish and Finnish 
air forces that takes place in the Swedish, Finnish and international airspace over the Baltic Sea, and 
also involves the air forces of NATO countries temporarily present in the Baltic states. The Swedes 
and Finns held the first exercise of this kind in late March 2015 alongside the USA (four F-18 Hornet 
fighter aircraft from Finland, eight JAS 39 Gripen fighter aircraft from Sweden, and several F-16 fi-
ghters from the United States). 
Moreover, in 2015, two bilateral exercises of the Finnish and US air forces took place. In late Au-
gust and early September 2015, the two countries held the Combined Flight Training Event (CFTE) 
involving two F-18 Hornet fighters and two A-10 close air support aircraft of the US (operating from 
the airbase in Ämari, Estonia). The exercise was conducted in international and Finnish airspace 
(southern Finland). In September 2015 the two states exercised air-to-air refuelling over northern 
Finland (around twenty F-18 Hornet fighters and an aerial refuelling aircraft from the United States).
